Watching the Netherlands play in the tournament is a pleasure for a person who loves tactics. In every match, Ronald Koeman and his team bring something new to the ball possession, so every match is different from the others and sometimes even periods completely change the formation and dynamics on the field, as was the case with Austria. The two most important questions Koeman always asks himself when choosing how his team will play with the ball are:
where the opponent has weaknesses and strengths that we can exploit or, if we talk about their strengths, we can neutralize; how do my players complement each other in terms of qualities?
Answering the second question, before the tournament Koeman, who was faced with the fact that key midfielder Frenkie de Jong was out of the squad due to injury, found the optimal combination, which finally came about in the game against Poland. He gave Gakpo a wide position on the left and Dumfries a wide position on the right. The rest of the players were positioned so that attacks started on the left side of the field, and the right side was for finishing (Dumfries and right winger) and controlling after a loss of the ball (right midfielder Schouten). For this, the characteristics of the squad were taken into account, where many players tend to play on the left, including substitutes and main striker Depay, Gakpo feels most comfortable holding an opponent in a wide position, and Dumfries reacts to any cross to the far post.
As the tournament progressed, this setup was adjusted because Joei Verman, the player who was supposed to replace De Jong, did not cope well with the pressure and heavy responsibility (here it should be understood that Frenkie is perceived in the Netherlands as the embodiment of pure football, and any player who replaces him will be scrutinized in every action). However, Koeman found a way out of the new problem: in the end, in the round of 16, his team showed the most convincing football.
Using the following five screenshots as an example, we will find out what happens with the construction of the “orange” attacks in each match of the tournament.
With the Romanians everything was very convincing:
These Netherlands can win the Euro! The main problem remains to be solved.
1. Poland – Netherlands. The goalkeeper is an additional central defender. Task: to manipulate the personal pressure of the Polish national team.
Photo: Frame from the video
The Netherlands knew that Poland would press one-on-one in the opponent’s half. So we needed a recipe that would allow us to attack regularly and painlessly. Considering that Nathan Ake plays as a left-back in the national team, easily operating in a low position like a central defender, the recipe was found here. Ake always remained in a low position, but it was necessary to somehow ensure that no one covered him again and again. Here Koeman’s team used goalkeeper Bart Verbruggen, who plays well with his feet.
It allowed the two centre-backs, de Vrij and van Dijk, to spread out to 40 metres and get between them to receive the ball, essentially as an extra centre-back. This in turn allowed right-back Dumfries to get very close to the centre-line, and Oranje had an extra player in possession, as a dozen Poles were forced to press 11 (in fact) Dutch outfield players. The main victim turned out to be the full-back de Frankowski, marked separately on the screen. In theory, he should put pressure on Ake, but to do so he had to run 30-40 metres each time, and each time he was forced to play with Gakpo or Depay, who moved to the left. Ake eventually became the main star of the match, and Gakpo regularly found himself in the attacking position in the dynamic.
2. Netherlands – France. In possession, think about defending. Objective: neutralise the French’s active left flank.
Photo: Frame from the video
In the second match of the tournament, the Netherlands did something that it rarely does: two players with an exclusively linear and lateral mentality entered the starting eleven on one side – we are talking, of course, about Dumfries and Frimpong, who are vacuuming the sideline together on the screen. This harmed the Netherlands in the opponent’s half of the field, where, as expected, they often almost took the ball away from each other, finding themselves in the same position. However, this formation for this match had a specific goal: the French national team, even without Mbappé, accumulates its main forces on the left, so it is necessary to have fast players in this zone, who look back more often than, for example, Simons does. Simons was given the role of “ten”, as Werman sat out after an unsuccessful first match, and Reynders took his position in the support zone, and Dumfries and Frimpong really secured the Netherlands in their area of responsibility.
The main victim turned out to be Depay; even on this screen you can see how he lacks connections with his partners to develop attacks. Depay played his worst game of the tournament, but in terms of team dynamics, Holland followed the plan and neutralized France.
3. Austria – Netherlands. Part 1: In search of the lost diamond Objective: Control Austrian pressure and use the wings at speed.
Photo: Frame from the video
After one of the most difficult games of the tournament against France, the Netherlands put on one of the greatest shows, playing several games at once in a match against Austria. We will focus on two of them. Koeman and his staff understood that the Austrian press could be strong and effective and therefore it was better to have another specialized defender closer to their goal, so Gertreida came out on the right instead of the more attacking Dumfries. Werman rehabilitated and became a starter again, as the team, under pressure, needed a midfielder with his ball-control qualities. In addition, the speedy Malen, who is comfortable attacking on the wing, came into attack on the right.
As a result, the “Oranje” setup was as follows: Depay dropped from his position as a striker to the “ten” position, leaving two forwards as wide as possible, so that when overcoming pressure he could immediately use the flanks with speed. Depay was also supposed to form a diamond in the center, together with Schouten, Woerman and Reynders. Werman swam again and was substituted before the break, but the problem was not only his. Koeman’s idea against the press was good, but crude: look at the distances between the players within the diamond – they are large, it is difficult for the midfielders to establish connections. Austria deservedly dominated until Woerman’s substitution.
4. Austria – Netherlands. Second half: the diamond is back, the advantage is found in the centre
Photo: Frame from the video
The Netherlands enter the second half with the same line-up as after replacing Woerman, but with a completely different configuration. Now it is not four, but three defenders who have possession, and the universal soldier Gertreida has moved into the support zone. It is interesting: Koeman could have released a specialized defensive player, but by switching to positional defense the problem of the right back would have arisen, and at the same time the Oranje coach did not abandon the desire to have a selector in case the start of the attack leads to a loss.
As a result, the Netherlands has a 3-4-3 with a diamond in the middle of the field. Now Depay doesn’t have to do purely supporting work, he can also think about how to attack the goal, even though the width is still crowded with Malen and Gakpo. The move immediately changed the game and the Netherlands produced their strongest run of the group stage, which Austria (successfully) had to stop with delays and constant fouls.
5. Netherlands – Romania. A square in the centre of the pitch for total dominance. Objective: to force the opponent to divide between controlling penetrating passes and defending on the flanks.
Photo: Frame from the video
New game, new team. Dominating the midfield diamond proved to be a learning experience for the first game of the playoffs, which Koeman entered with a square in the middle, where the number 10 pair sits almost exactly above the pivot pair and adjusts their positions to the spaces that arise from passes from the full-backs. To form a square, the Dutch coaching staff remembered Bergwijn in the reserve team, who plays very well in the number 10 position and knows how to open between the lines.
The problem for an opponent facing a square is this. You have to position your midfielders and full-backs ever narrower in order to be able to control the large number of players between the lines. The screenshot shows that the Romanian left-back is having a difficult time: he starts to narrow against Bergwijn, and the further the match goes on, the narrower he gets. This opens up a plan B within plan A: if the opponent narrows, he leaves the flanks free, which suited the Dutch perfectly. In the situation of the first goal, both worked: first there was a penetrating pass to Simons, and then it turned out that Gakpo in the width was not controlled by anyone, as the Romanian right-back began to narrow hard. The Dutch left the opponent under a short blanket, where either his legs or head were left uncovered.
The win over Romania was an impressive performance and it seems clear that the plan must continue, but there is no doubt that Koeman and his team will come up with something special for the quarter-final against Turkey.
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